In a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, we examine the effects of a debt policy rule under which the government must reduce its debt-GDP ratio if it exceeds the criterion level. To sustain public debt at a finite level, the government should adjust public spending rather than the income tax rate. The long run debt-GDP ratio should be kept sufficiently low to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy. Under sustainability and determinacy, a tighter (looser) debt rule brings welfare gains when the world interest rate is relatively high (low).
Introduction
Debt-GDP ratios in Italy, Ireland, and Portugal also exceeded 100 percent. These weak fiscal conditions raised doubts about these countries' abilities to finance their increased debt. As a response to the crisis, the EU has introduced strong fiscal consolidations under the surveillance of the European Commission. Overall public deficits were reduced thanks to expenditure cuts, especially lower public investments, as stated in Public finances in EMU (2012).
1 According to the Stability and Convergence Programmes submitted to the Commission and Council in Spring 2012, EU member states plan to base further fiscal consolidation on expenditure cuts that include reductions in public investment.
According to the debt reduction benchmark introduced by the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the so-called Six-Pack in December 2011, member states whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold have to reduce the distance to 60%
by an average rate of one-twentieth per year. 2 It is important to investigate the effects of the debt-reduction rule proposed by the SGP under its requirements.
Some authors have examined the effects of such a debt-reduction rule. In an endogenous growth model whose growth engine is the flow of public service as in Barro (1990) , Futagami et al. (2008) investigate the effects of a government bond-issuance rule that requires the government to reduce its debt at a steady pace if its debt is beyond the criterion level. Maebayashi et al. (2013) uses an endogenous growth model whose engine of growth is public capital accumulation to study the same issue. These authors provide interesting results, but their investigations are confined to closed economies; accordingly, transactions in foreign capital markets are removed. In reality, both the government and private sector can borrow and lend their assets in the foreign capital market. Countries holding large levels of debt such as Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Portugal hold large external debt as well. This shows the significance of studying the debt policy rule described here in a model of an open economy.
For our purpose, we consider an endogenously growing small open economy where the government adopts a debt-reduction rule. As in Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (1997) , public capital accumulated through public investment has positive effects on private goods production. The government finances its spending on public investment by imposing a tax on income and by issuing bonds. Public bond-issuance is under the restriction of the same debt policy rule as that in Futagami et al. (2008) . We consider two types of public finance budget regimes. In budgetary regime (I), if the debt-GDP ratio exceeds the criterion level, the government adjusts its expenditure with a fixed tax rate to reduce this ratio. In budgetary regime (II), if the debt-GDP ratio exceeds the criterion level, the government controls the tax rate to reduce its debt with a fixed expenditure ratio. In both regimes, the debt-GDP ratio tends to the criterion level in the long run.
The criterion level can be considered as the long-run debt-GDP ratio.
In budgetary regime (I), there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium. The long-run debt-GDP ratio is a crucial determinant of the steady-state stability and equilibrium (in)determinacy. When the long-run debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently low, the steady state is saddle stable and hence exhibits equilibrium determinacy. However, if the government sets a high criterion debt-GDP ratio, equilibrium indeterminacy arises because the steady state is a sink or there exists a limit cycle around the steady state. 3 The data in countries in the Euro area show that the 60% criterion level of the debt-GDP ratio proposed by the SGP may not be sufficiently low to ensure equilibrium determinacy.
3 Some authors study the relation between fiscal policy and indeterminacy. Focusing on balanced budget rules, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Harrison (2004, 2008 ) discuss the effects of fiscal policies on equilibrium indeterminacy in closed economies. Farmer (1986) and Greiner (2007) show that in closed economies, limit cycles emerge and equilibrium indeterminacy arises when the government controls the value of its deficit rather than the value of its debt.
We also examine the welfare effects of debt reduction under budgetary regime (I), assuming that the long-run debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently low to ensure determinacy.
The welfare effects of debt reduction depend on the rates of returns from private savings and public investment. In our small open economy, the rate of return from private savings is equal to the world interest rate. When the world interest rate is higher (lower) than the rate of return from public investment, reductions in government debt improve (deteriorate) welfare. Furthermore, the pace of debt reduction is an important determinant of the magnitude of welfare gains (losses). When the world interest rate is higher than the rate of return from public savings, the government can further improve welfare by reducing the debt at a faster pace. In contrast, if the world interest rate is relatively low, the government can mitigate welfare losses by reducing the debt at a slower pace.
In budgetary regime (II), there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium. However, the steady state is always unstable under budgetary regime (II). Because the economy cannot reach the unstable steady state, it makes little sense to study the characteristics of the unstable steady state, and hence, we do not examine the welfare effects of debt reduction in regime (II). Nevertheless, our model provides the following important implication. Suppose that the initial private domestic savings cannot afford to absorb the initial outstanding government debt and the government then borrows from foreign investors. In such a situation, under regime (II), households eventually become overextended with foreign debt, and there exists no equilibrium such that the government can follow the debt-reduction rule. Then, regime (II) is unsuitable for sustaining public debt.
There exist studies on public debt finance in endogenous growth models where government services or public capital are inputs for private goods production (see, e.g., Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Greiner and Semmler (2000) , Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) , Greiner (2007 Greiner ( , 2012 , and Yakita (2008) ). These studies explore the policy implications of public debt finance for equilibrium dynamics, long-run growth, and welfare. However, few studies investigate the debt-reduction rule found in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, except Futagami et al. (2008) , Minea and Villieu (2013) , and Maebayashi et al.
(2013). The present study differs from these studies on the debt-reduction rule in the following three points.
First, although these studies focus only on closed economies, we consider an open economy and show that the openness of the economy provides important implications for equilibrium (in)determinacy. Assuming that the public debt-to-private-capital ratio is constrained by the debt-reduction rule and focusing only on regime (I), Futagami et al. (2008) show that the debt-reduction rule may be a source of indeterminacy. However, Minea and Villieu (2013) indicate that this result crucially depends on how to construct the dynamic system, showing that indeterminacy never arises if the debt-GDP ratio is In our small open model, the stability of the steady state under regime (I) crucially depends on the long-run debt-GDP ratio, whereas the steady state is always unstable under regime (II), which implies that regime (II) is unsuitable for sustaining public debt. Furthermore, our study is related to the literature on the relationship between fiscal policy and sustainability of economies. It can be compared to the existing results on fiscal sustainability. Assuming that the government adjusts the income tax rate in closed economy models, Bräuninger (2005) and Yakita (2008) show that when the initial debt is too large, the debt-GDP ratio grows unboundedly; hence, public debt is not sustainable.
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These papers explore the conditions under which public debt can be sustained. In contrast, we investigate which budgetary regime the government should adopt to sustain its debt.
Under regime (I), the government can sustain its debt on the condition that the criterion level of the debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently low. However, if the government adopts regime (II) when it borrows from foreign investors, households eventually become overextended with foreign debt, and the economy loses the ability to pay back its debt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 investigates the local stability and social welfare under budgetary regime (I).
Section 4 examines budgetary regime (II). Section 5 concludes.

Model
We consider a small open economy. A single final good is produced using labor, private capital, and public capital (infrastructure). It is assumed that the final good and private capital are freely traded beyond the country's borders. However, individuals cannot migrate, and public capital (social infrastructure) cannot cross borders. To construct social infrastructure, the government must make public investments. Chalk (2000) show that permanent budget deficits cannot be sustainable unless the interest rate is less than the growth rate in closed economies. 5 The benchmark model assumes that the agents are faced with the constant world interest rate. Following Chatterjee et al. (2003) , Appendix G extends the benchmark model assuming that the interest rate varies depending on the fiscal condition of the economy. This extension does not affect our main results.
Households
We consider a representative household. The size of the population is normalized to one.
Let C t be consumption at time t. The utility of the representative household is given by
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. 
some fractions of private capital or government bonds are owned by foreign agents. We assume that the tax takes the residence base form. Then, residents' income is taxed at a uniform rate regardless of its source country, while non-residents' income is not taxed.
Thus, the flow budget constraint of the representative household iṡ
where τ t denotes the income tax rate at time t. In contrast to Futagami et al. (2008) who assume a constant tax rate, we allow τ t to vary over time, as we discuss later. In an open economy, the household can borrow from foreign countries, and hence, A t can be negative.
However, A t must satisfy the no-Ponzi game (NPG) condition, lim
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2) , which yieldṡ
and the transversality condition (TVC), lim
Firms
As in Futagami et al. (1993) , the production function of the representative firm is given 
where
. Given perfect competition and profit maximization, we obtain
The world interest rate, r, is constant because of the assumption of a small country. Thus, x t and ω t become constant over time. The following discussion omits time index t from x t and ω t . In equilibrium, we have L t = 1. Then, Y t grows at the same rate as K g,t (see (4) ). For later use, we define
Government
To construct infrastructure, the government makes public investments. 
where B t stands for outstanding government debt, andḂ t denotes newly-issued government bonds. Using
If the government debt increases at a rate higher than (1 − τ t )r, no agents are willing to hold government bonds. Therefore, the government must satisfy
Similar to the reform of the SGP in 2011 for EU countries, we assume that the government must reduce its debt-GDP ratio at a steady pace if its level is beyond the criterion level. To simply formulate this rule, we follow Futagami et al. (2008) and assume that the government adjusts its debt-GDP ratio, b t ≡ B t /Y t , according to the following rule:
whereb > 0 and ϕ > 0 represent the criterion level of the government's debt-GDP ratio and the adjustment coefficient of the rule, respectively. If b t >b holds, the government reduces its debt by 100ϕ percent of the difference between the current and target levels of b. Then, if ϕ = 0.05 andb = 0.6, the debt policy rule, (7) , is well suited to the debt reduction benchmark introduced by the SGP (i.e., member states whose current debt-GDP ratio is above 60 percent must reduce their debt-GDP ratio distance to 60 percent by an average rate of one twentieth per year). We assume b 0 ≥b, because the average debt-GDP ratio in the Euro area in 2011 reached 88 percent of GDP (which is higher than the criterion level of 60 percent). If ϕ takes a large (small) value, the government adjusts b t to the criterion level at a fast (slow) pace.
Given this adjustment rule, the government chooses either τ t or g t to satisfy the budget constraint, (6) . 8 The present study considers two types of budgetary regimes: (I) the government sets a constant τ and adjusts g t to satisfy (6) and (7), or (II) the government chooses a constant g, and τ t is then endogenously determined to satisfy (6) and (7).
Adjustments in Public Investments: Regime (I)
We first consider the economy under budgetary regime (I), where the government sets a constant τ ∈ (0, 1) and adjusts public investments to satisfy (6) and (7). We begin with the derivation of the dynamic system under regime (I). We define 
From (2), (3), (5b), (6), and the definitions of I t and γ t , we obtaiṅ
Eliminatingḃ t from (7) and (8a) and solving for γ t using g t = k g γ t , we obtain
This equation shows that if the government reducesb, γ t decreases (increases) in the short run if b t < (>)k g . The government can reduce its debt-GDP ratio in two ways.
One is reducing its debt, B t , and the other is enhancing the output growth through public investments. When b t is sufficiently small to satisfy b t < k g , the government can reduce 8 Dividing both sides of (6) by Y t , we obtainḃ t = (r − γ t )b t + g t − τ t (ra t + ωk g ). The flow budget constraint of the government is represented by τ t and g t . This is Equation (8a) we derive later.
9 Because g t = k g γ t , the choice of g t is equivalent to that of γ t . When we discuss regime (I) in the following, we mainly focus on γ t rather than g t .
b t easier by reducing B t rather than by enhancing output growth. In contrast, when b t > k g holds, enhancing output growth is the easier way to reduce b t . Hence, when the government reducesb, γ t decreases (increases) in the short run if b t < (>)k g . Note that (i) the effects of reductions inb on γ t (= g t /k g ) become stronger as ϕ becomes larger, because the government must reduce b t at a faster pace and (ii) effects on γ t (= g t /k g ) gradually disappear as b t becomes close tob.
Substituting (9) into (8b) and (8c) yieldṡ
The dynamic system is then given by (7), (10a), and (10b) together with the initial values, b 0 and a 0 .
Steady State and Stability
We derive the steady-state equilibrium whereḃ t =ȧ t =ċ t = 0 holds. We setḃ t = a t =ċ t = 0 in (7), (10a), and (10b), and we solve for b t , a t , c t , and γ t using (9). The steady-state values of b t , a t , c t , and γ t are, respectively, given by b * I =b(> 0),
To ensure positive growth, we assume that γ *
income at the steady state is given by (ra * We next examine the stability of the steady state characterized by b * I =b and (11a)-(11c). We linearize the dynamic system around the steady state characterized by b * I =b and (11a)-(11c), and then we obtain
We denote the Jacobian matrix of (12) 
The signs of m 22 and m 32 indicate the stability of the steady-state equilibrium and can prove the next proposition. ii. ifb >b, the steady state is locally unstable.
Proposition 2 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that γ
* I = (1 − τ )r − ρ > 0. 1. Ifb < k g ,
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(b) When τ < r/ω, the steady state is locally unstable.
Proposition 2 shows that whenb is large (b > k g ), the steady state becomes unstable under some conditions. However, this does not mean that there is no equilibrium.
Proposition 3 shows the possibility of an equilibrium that exhibits a limit cycle. (Proof) See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that γ
The properties of the equilibrium path heavily depend onb. Whenb is sufficiently small to satisfyb < k g , the equilibrium path is uniquely determined. However, whenb takes a moderate value (k g <b <b) and τ > r/ω holds, the steady state is locally stable and exhibits indeterminacy. In other cases, the steady state is unstable. However, as proven in Proposition 3, there exists a limit cycle around the steady state. In Figures 1 and 2 , we illustrate a numerical example of a stable limit cycle. 11 In this example, indeterminacy arises because there are multiple equilibrium paths that converge to a stable limit cycle.
10 Note thatb is larger than k g if τ > r/ω holds. See Appendix A. 11 In this example, we assume the Cobb-Douglas production function: The intuition behind indeterminacy is as follows: Suppose that households expect future increases in G t . Because increases in G t have positive effects on output growth and labor wage (see (4) and (5b)), this expectation implies that households also expect future increases in output growth and labor income. Households then have a lesser incentive to save, and a t thus decreases in the future. As a result, the government's tax revenue decreases, which tightens its budget constraint. As discussed just below (9), the government-which is constrained with tight budgets-has two ways to reduce b t ≡ B t /Y t according to (7) : one is to reduce the debt, B t , which requires reductions in public investments, G t , and the other is to increase public investments, G t , in order to stimulate output growth. When b t > k g holds, enhancing output growth is an easier way to reduce b t than paying back B t . Then, ifb > k g , households' expectations are self-fulfilling and equilibrium indeterminacy arises. In the numerical example of the limit cycle in Figure   2 , government spending and private asset holdings move in opposite directions, which is Finally, we refer to an empirical implication of the determinacy condition:b < k g . Kamps (2006) . Netherlands, the 60% criterion level of the debt-GDP ratio proposed by the SGP may not be sufficiently low to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Besides, this result holds stably in that term.
Welfare Analysis
To examine the welfare effects of reductions inb under budgetary regime (I), we consider the following scenario. The economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium charac- 
When the government unexpectedly reducesb at time 0, c 0 jumps to its new value just at time 0; however, other variables in (15) 
where v 2 and v 3 are defined in (C.3a) and (C.3b).
We now explain our scenario in more detail. ≈ 0. Then, the effect of marginal changes inb can be expressed
The calculation procedure from the first to the second lines in (17) is presented in Appendix D. We can easily show that λ 2 − ρ > 0 and Ψ(0) = 0.
We can show that if r < (>)ω holds, we have ρ + τ r < (>)λ 2 . 14 Then, if r < (>)ω,
Because ϕ has no effect on c * I , the discussion so far yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider budgetary regime (I). Suppose that γ
b < k g and that the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium. The welfare effects of reductions inb depend on the relationship between r and ω.
When r > ω, reductions inb improve welfare. Furthermore, the value of ϕ provides an important implication. When r > ω, the government can further improve welfare by reducing b t at a faster pace. In contrast, when r < ω, the government can mitigate welfare losses by reducing b t at a slower pace.
To interpret Proposition 4 intuitively, we rewrite households' income, I t = rA t + w t , as I t = rA t +ωK g,t by using (5b). Households' income depends on their assets, A t , and public capital, K g,t . A t accumulates through savings of the private sector (households), whereas K g,t accumulates through public investments by the government. We can consider public investments as savings of the public sector. Consequently, r and ω can be considered the rates of return on private and public savings, respectively. If r < ω holds, accumulating assets through public savings is socially more efficient. Because reductions inb have negative effects on public investments (savings) whenb < k g holds as discussed below (9), reductions inb reduce households' welfare. When ϕ is small, the initial decline in γ t is also small, which mitigates the negative welfare effects. When r > ω holds, accumulating assets through public savings is not socially efficient. Because reductions inb depress public investments (savings), welfare improves. When ϕ is large, the initial decline in γ t is also large. Then, public investments are further depressed and households' welfare further improves.
Tax Adjustments: Regime(II)
We now move onto budgetary regime (II), where the government sets a constant γ(= g/k g ) and adjusts τ t to satisfy (7) We first derive the dynamic system. Eliminatingḃ t from (7) and (8a) and solving for τ t , we obtain
When the government reducesb, τ t increases in the short run because the government must earn a larger primary surplus to reduce b t . The effect on τ t becomes stronger as ϕ increases and gradually disappears as b t approachesb. The following two points should be mentioned. First, when a t = −ωk g /r, τ t cannot be defined; thus, the optimization problem of the household is not well-defined. Then, the transitional paths along which a t moves across −ωk g /r must not be equilibrium. Second, when a t is so small that household income (ra t + ωk g )Y t is negative, τ t tends to be negative; thus, household tax payments τ t (ra t + ωk g )Y t tend to be positive despite that household income is negative. Then, the representative household must borrow from abroad to make tax payments beyond its income. In other words, the government forces the household to borrow from abroad in order to meet the budget constraint of the government. Although the case makes little sense in practice, it is theoretically possible and provides important implications as we later show. Substituting (18) into (8b) and (8c) yieldṡ
The dynamic system is given by (7), (19a), and (19b) along with b 0 and a 0 .
We next derive the steady-state equilibrium, whereḃ t =ȧ t =ċ t = 0 holds. We seṫ b t =ȧ t =ċ t = 0 in (7), (18) 
From ( As shown in Appendix E, the Jacobian matrix of the linearized dynamic system has only one stable root, −ϕ. Because there are two state variables, b t and a t , the economy cannot approach the steady-state equilibrium unless b 0 and a 0 are respectively equal tob and a * II by chance. We thus obtain the next proposition. The intuition of Proposition 5 is as follows. We focus on the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in the Euler equation of the household. Under regime (II), the income tax rate is inversely related to asset holding of the household. When a t is lower (higher) than that of the steady state, the income tax rate is raised (lowered) to finance the constant government spending. This lowers (raises) the rate of return of savings. Then, the household decreases (increases) asset holdings and a t gets away from the steady state.
Proposition 5 Consider budgetary regime (II). Suppose that
Therefore, the steady state is unstable in regime (II).
Because the economy cannot reach the unstable steady-state equilibrium, it makes little sense to continue studying the characteristics of the steady state. However, our model provides other important implications. Using (7), we solve (19a) and then rearrange the solution using inequality c t > 0:
Note that the debt rule, (7), ensures lim t→+∞ b t =b and r − γ > 0 is assumed. Suppose It is also shown that even if a 0 < −ωk g /r holds and a t does not move across −ωk g /r along the transition, there exists no equilibrium. As shown in (18), τ t tends to zero as a t tends to −∞. Then, for a large t, the discounted sum of households' labor income can be written as
In the first equality, we use τ t = 0 for a large t, (5b), and the definition of k g . The second equality usesẎ t /Y t = γ and r > γ. The assumption γ < r − ρ(< r) ensures the last inequality. Because a t = −∞ for a large t, the inequality −a t > ωk g /(r − γ) holds for a large t. From (22) and the definition of a t , the following inequality is obtained for a large t:
This inequality implies that for a large t, households' borrowing eventually exceeds the discounted sum of their labor income, and households would thus be unable to pay off 15 Appendix G provides the derivation of (21).
their borrowing. Therefore, rational expectations and perfect foresight ensure that foreign agents do not lend to such households. The next remark summarizes the discussion so far.
Remark
Consider budgetary regime (II). Suppose that γ < r − ρ and a
0 − b 0 < −(ω − γ)k g /(r − γ).
Then, there exists no equilibrium such that the government can follow the debt-reduction
rule, (7) .
indicates that households' initial asset holdings tend to be smaller than the government's initial outstanding debt, which means that private domestic savings cannot absorb the outstanding government debt; thus, the government borrows from foreign investors. Our result implies that in such a case, under regime (II), households eventually become overextended with foreign debt. Therefore, there exists no equilibrium where the government can follow the debt-reduction rule, (7).
Maebayashi et al. (2013) show that in a closed economy where the government follows (7) and adopts budgetary regime (II), the unique steady state is always saddle stable and the economy converges to the steady state where the debt-GDP ratio remains constant over time. Then, there always exists an equilibrium where the government can follow the debt-reduction rule, (7), if it is a closed economy. To reduce its debt-GDP ratio, the government imposes a high tax rate on the interest income under regime (II) (see (18)), which discourages household savings and negatively affects a t . However, households in a closed economy cannot borrow from abroad, and hence, a t cannot be smaller than b t .
Therefore, households in a closed economy do not lose the ability to pay back debt. In 
Concluding Remarks
We examine how the debt-reduction rule found in the SGP affects the dynamics of the economy and welfare in a small open economy model where the government can borrow from abroad to finance its debt. Public capital accumulated by public investments has positive externalities on goods production.
In (13)). From the second equation of (14), one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (12) is negative while the other is positive. Then, the steady state is locally saddle stable and exhibits local determinacy.
2. Ifb > k g holds, m 32 > 0 (see (14) and (13)). Using (11a) and (13), we rewrite m 22 as (14), we know that the real parts of both λ 1 and λ 2 are negative.
The steady state is locally stable and exhibits local indeterminacy.
Ifb >b holds,b > k g because inequality τ > r/ω ensures that 
Then, m 22 > 0 and m 32 > 0, which implies that the real parts of the two eigenvalues are positive.
B Proof of Proposition 3
We show the existence of limit cycles by applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem. 16 Because Jacobian matrix M (defined in (12)) has one negative eigenvalue, −ϕ, the dynamic system can exhibit Hopf bifurcation if its submatrix has a couple of complex eigenvalues. A necessary and sufficient condition for complex
Substituting (11a) and (11b) into (B.1), we obtain
Multiplying both sides by (k g −b) 2 and arranging it as a polynomial ofb, we have
The critical values of quadratic inequality (B.2) arê
where these real numbers are well-defined under the assumption that r/ω < 1. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for complex eigenvalues isb − <b <b + . M ′ has complex eigenvalues becauseb − <b <b + . The real part of these eigenvalues,
, equals zero only whenb =b; it is also differentiable and increasing inb. Thus,b is the unique bifurcation value of parameterb, and submatrix M ′ has a couple of complex eigenvalues in any sufficiently small neighborhood ofb. Therefore, by the Hopf bifurcation theorem, there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that either of the following cases is true: (i)
there exists a stable limit cycle for everyb such thatb <b <b + ε, or (ii) there exists an 
C Derivation of c 0
We derive the saddle path that converges to the steady state we consider. Becauseb < k g holds, we can assume λ 1 < 0 and λ 2 > 0. Because m 32 < 0 holds in the case ofb < k g (see Appendix A), √ m 22 2 − 4m 32 > |m 22 |. Then, λ 1 and λ 2 are given by
Given b 0 and a 0 , we solve (12) and obtain 
In (C.3a) and (C.3b), we use (14) , which implies that ϕ 2 + m 22 ϕ + m 32 = (ϕ + λ 1 )(ϕ + λ 2 ).
From (C.2), c 0 is given by (16) . (17) From (11a) 
D Derivation of
Because λ 2 is a solution of Ω(z) = 0, Ω(λ 2 ) = λ 2 2 − m 22 λ 2 + m 32 = 0, which implies that
where ∂γ(a * I ,b)/∂a t is given by (13) . In deriving this equation, we use the definitions of m 22 and m 32 . Substituting this equation into (D.1) yields
On the second line, we use the definition of m 32 . The second equation of (14) into the first line of (17) yields the second line of (17) .
E Stability of the Steady State: Regime (II)
To examine the stability of the steady-state equilibrium, we linearize the dynamic system around the steady state characterized by b * II =b and (20a)-(20c):
One of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is given by −ϕ < 0. The other two, chance, the economy cannot achieve the steady-state equilibrium.
F Derivation of (21)
We define z t ≡ a t − b t . Using (7) and the definition of z t , we rewrite (19a
Because c t > 0 holds for all t ≥ 0, this equation implies the following inequality:
Substituting z t = a t − b t into this equation yields (21) .
G An Extention: Variable Interest Rate
We extend the model in the main text to include an interest rate that is affected by an endogenous variable representative of the fiscal conditions of the economy. Intuitively, even in a small open economy, an interest rate for the agents in the economy can vary according to fiscal conditions because the risk premium for debt depends on them.
Some works such as Chatterjee et al. (2003) incorporate it in the following way. Let
. This is net foreign debt per GDP. We think of this as an indicator of fiscal conditions and interest rate r t depends on n t :
where r(·) is a nondecreasing function. Following Chatterjee et al. (2003), we adopt the following specification of r(·) when we conduct numerical analyses:
where r * is a constant and parameter σ > 0 is response strength of the interest rate for the fiscal conditions. When n t > 0, the economy borrows from abroad and then the interest rate for the economy rises from natural level r * , which reflects a risk premium.
G.1 Model
We incorporate a positive rate of depreciation of private capital, denoted by δ k , and adopt a Cobb-Douglas type production function. The profit of the representative firm is
By (G.2), the first-order conditions of the firm's problem are
. From (G.3) and (G.4), we have
Besides, public capital-to-GDP ratio is
Note that by the specification of r(·), the price system and other key variables depend on n t and vary with time.
The government adopts the same debt policy rule:
and faces the flow-budget constraint
For numerical analyses, we assume a positive rate of depreciation for public capital, denoted by δ g . The dynamic equation of public capital accumulation iṡ
G.2 Regime (I)
We first consider regime (I) where the government sets a constant τ ∈ (0, 1) and adjusts public investment. As in the basic model, using the budget constraint of the representative household, we can obtain government expenditure per GDP as a function of (b t , n t , c t ):
, where ε(n t ) =
Together with the Euler equation, the model is reduced to a dynamic system of b t , n t , and c t . Through some long manipulations, we obtain the following differential equations:
where ∆(
G.3 Local Determinacy
Let (b * , n * , c * ) be the stationary point. It satisfies
Because this nonlinear system has no closed-form solution, we hereafter conduct numerical analyses. We linearize the dynamical system around the stationary point and check the signs of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. If the number of eigenvalues with a negative real part is three, the stationary point is a sink. Equilibrium indeterminacy arises because the system includes just one jumpable variable, c t .
We adopt a benchmark parameter value as follows. On the household's preference and the production function, we choose a popular value: ρ = 0.05, θ = 1, α = 0.36. As a standard income tax rate and interest rate, we set τ = 0. 15 Figure 4 illustrates the same.
As σ increases, the unique equilibrium area becomes larger. This result is very intuitive.
Since one of the sources of indeterminacy in a small open economy is fixed interest rates, the existence of a variable component in the interest rate weakens this indeterminacy.
However, more importantly, we should note that a variable interest rate does not eliminate equilibrium indeterminacy. Besides, for plausible values of σ, indeterminacy can arises under a not so highb in our model. The mechanism underlying indeterminacy is given in the main text, and is important when creating debt-policy rules.
G.4 Welfare
The lifetime utility of the representative household is
From the Euler equation, we have C t = C 0 e
0 γc,udu . Substituting this into (G.5) and differentiating it with respcet tob, we obtain
We analyze E(
∂U ∂b
) for both cases of unique equilibrium and multiple equilibria.
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Based on the welfare analysis in the main text, we consider the following scenario.
At the initial time, the economy stays at the stationary point:
Then, the government unexpectedly marginally reducesb tob new . Since this is a marginal change, we may take the following approximation:
In the case of a unique equilibrium, the economy jumps into a new saddle path and monotonically converges to the new stationary point. In the case of equilibrium indeterminacy, for simplicity, we assume that a sunspot shock hits the economy only at the same time the government reducesb. Wherever it jumps, the economy converges as in the determinate case because the stationary point of the local dynamical system is a sink.
Case of a Unique Equilibrium
In the case of a unique equilibrium, using (G.7) and (G.8), we find the equilibrium path of the linearized model and substitute it into (G.6). Table 2 provides the results. 21 See the rows labeled as "D". The main findings are as follows.
• For plausible parameter values, a marginal reduction inb worsens social welfare. This is consistent with the result in the original model (see Proposition 4). In the 19 Note that ∂n0 ∂b = 0 because n t is a predetermined variable. 20 In the case of multiple equilibria, we focus on solutions with sunspot shocks. Therefore, the partial derivative should be evaluated by the expected value. In the case of a unique equilibrium, the model does not contain any stochastic component. 21 Because we should treat both cases of unique and multiple equilibria and the threshold (with respect tob) depends strongly on σ, we properly change the sets of alternative values ofb according to the values of σ as described in Table 1 ) given (σ,b, ϕ). D (I) means equilibrium is determinate (indeterminate) under (σ,b). N (U) means sunspot shocks follow a normal distribution (uniform distribution). Note that ϕ does not affect equilibrium determinacy.
original model, a reduction inb has a detrimental effect, if r < ω(= 1 − α), which widely holds in usual cases. Inequality r < ω(= 1 − α) also holds in this numerical analysis, and accordingly, a marginal reduction inb worsens social welfare.
• The role of adjustment speed too is similar to that in the case of fixed interest rates.
We can conclude that at least with regard to the qualitative aspect, the welfare effect of a reduction inb and the mechanism underlying it do not change basically even under an endogenous interest rate.
• The welfare implication of a change in (b, ϕ) is similar to the basic model in which the interest rate is perfectly fixed.
• The existence of a variable component in the interest rate (i.e., σ > 0) yields a quantitatively crucial effect on social welfare.
22 This is because the mechanism underlying the welfare implication in the basic model depends on the assumption that the interest rate is perfectly fixed. Thus, it is natural that the absolute value of the welfare effect is decreasing in the degree of variability of the interest rate.
Case of Multiple Equilibria
In the case of multiple equilibria, we consider sunspot solutions. 23 Denote the three eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix by λ 1 , λ 2 , and λ 3 and the associated eigenvectors by ). In Table 2 , the rows labeled "I" present the results for this analysis. Labels, "N" and "U" indicate that sunspot shocks follow a normal and uniform distribution, respectively. The main findings are as follows.
• Both the distributions yield qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Although the welfare effect in general varies for each realization of κ 2 , the expected value is stable due to the symmetry of the distributions. We conjecture that this is from sunspot shocks following any symmetric distributions with sufficiently small variances.
• Except for the case of σ = 0, the relationships between adjustment speed ϕ and welfare effect E(
∂U ∂b
) are similar to that in the case of equilibrium determinacy and hence the original model. In the case of σ = 0, the sign of E( ∂U ∂b ) reverses. Its absolute value increases in ϕ even in this case.
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G.5 Regime (II)
We now consider regime (II) where τ is endogenous and g = G/Y is exogenous. The dynamics system is given bẏ
n t = ∆(n t )Ψ(b t , n t , c t )n t , c t = [ (1 − τ (b t , n t , c t ))r(n t ) − ρ + (∆(n t ) − 1)Ψ(b t , n t , c t ) − gk g (n t ) −1 + δ g ] c t , 24 According to the dynamical equations, κ 1 = b 0 −b. Given κ 2 , the value of κ 3 is determined so that the initial value satisfies (G.9) .
25 We obtain similar results for sufficiently small values of σ > 0, for example, σ = 10 −5 . Thus, the welfare effect seems to have continuity at σ = 0 with respect to σ. Besides, similar results hold when there are no sunspot shocks. The phase diagram seems to exhibit some complicated changes between the cases of a saddle and sink nearby σ = 0.
where ∆(n t ) = r(n t )(b t − n t ) + ω .
We derive the steady state whereḃ t =ṅ t =ċ t = 0. Fromṅ t = Ψ(b t , n t , c t ) = 0 anḋ c t = 0, we obtain
If r is fixed, the right-hand side (RHS) of (G.10) is constant. If r ′ (n) > 0, the RHS is an increasing function of n as long as the long-run growth rate, γ = To examine the stability of this steady state, we use the specification of (G. This result shows that even when r is endogenously determined, the steady state may be unstable for a wide range of parameters.
